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Abstract 
 
One of the main questions currently facing scholars of civil religion is how civil 
religions, and in particular national civil religions, are being reconfigured in 
response to the contemporary repositioning of the nation state within the 
supranational political, economic, legal and cultural orders entailed by globalization. 
This article first surveys some of the main arguments to emerge from the civil religion 
literature in this regard. It then contributes to these debates by outlining how current  
reconfigurations of national civil religion manifest in the case of a protest movement 
called the English Defence League (EDL). Specifically, this article describes how 
rituals and symbols of national belonging have, at least for adherents and supporters 
of this group, been reinvigorated by infusing them with symbols that invoke notions 
of civilizational belonging and are replete with references to an imminent “clash of 
civilizations”. 
 
Since the English Defence League (EDL) first emerged during the spring and 
summer of 2009, it has been one of the UK’s, and Europe’s, most controversial social 
movement organisations. Although the EDL initially drew its support from a 
network of football hooligan firms and small ultra-patriotic groups, the support base 
soon expanded, and during the last three years EDL activists have organised 
frequent mass demonstrations – anything from 500 to 2000 people – in towns and 
cities across the country (Copsey 2010; Jackson 2011). The focus of these protests has 
been, depending on which activists one speaks with, either “militant Islam” or more 
generally the threats that Islam is seen to pose to an imagined English way of lifei 
(Bartlett & Littler 2011; Copsey 2010; Jackson 2011) – a focus that has situated the 
EDL firmly within a broader and highly significant discursive trend that has 
characterized the resurgence of nationalist and far right political parties and protest 
groups across Europe (Betz 2003; Goodwin 2011; Mudde 2007). 
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In this article I situate the EDLii and their use of rituals and symbols of national 
belonging within the debate around one of the most salient questions currently 
facing scholars of civil religion - understood for the purposes of this article as “a set 
of social and cultural principles, values and rituals oriented toward the civil and 
political orderiii” (Cristi 2009, p.48). This is the question of how civil religion, and in 
particular national civil religions, are being reconfigured in response to the 
contemporary repositioning of the nation state within the supranational political, 
economic, legal and cultural orders entailed by globalization (Cristi & Dawson 2007; 
Hvithamar & Warburg 2009). In doing so, I aim both to provide an introduction to 
some of the main arguments within this debate and to open up the study of the EDL 
and other similar groups to new theoretical perspectives. 
 
National civil religions under pressure 
 
Since Bellah published Civil Religion in America, the concept of civil religion has been 
intimately linked to that of the nation. Indeed, one of the main contributions of the 
civil religion literature has been the many rich accounts it has generated of how 
symbols of the nation – flags, anthems, even the bodies and blood of those who fight 
for their country – have operated as sacred objects within rituals of nationhood 
(Hedetoft 2009; Marvin & Ingle 1999), and of how such symbols and rituals have in 
turn formed a basis for the “imagining” and “creation” of the nation (Anderson 
1991; see also Gellner 1987; Smith 2000). 
 
This focus on national civil religions reflects in part the prominence of the nation 
state in 20th century politics and socio-political thought. But it also reflects the 
intellectual heritage of the concept of civil religion (Bellah 1967; 1995; Turner 1991, 
p.51). As Bellah argues, the Durkheimian position on which he built was 
 
that traditional religion was on its way out, essentially because it conflicts 
with science. But the concept of the sacred would remain [because] without 
this basis of moral respect society itself is impossible. But what would be the 
referent to which sacred symbols refer? Durkheim replied “society,” and as 
the most comprehensive functioning society the “nation”. (Bellah 1995, p.47). 
 
Yet while scholarship on civil religion has tended to focus on national civil religion, 
several authors have also commented on the precarious position in which national 
civil religion finds itself in the late 20th and early 21st century (Bellah 1976; Cristi & 
Dawson 2007; Hvithamar & Warburg 2009). Bellah in fact even wondered whether 
research on civil religion may have come to prominence at precisely the time when 
the social and political relevance of national civil religion was already beginning to 
wane (Cristi & Dawson 2007). 
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What has put “the sacrality of national attachment in jeopardy” (Hedetoft 2009, 
p.263) is the way the position of the nation within the contemporary political and 
cultural world order has itself been brought into question (Hvithamar & Warburg 
2009). The formation of legal, political, technological, moral and cultural systems 
that transcend the nation-state have challenged notions of national sovereignty, 
undermined differences between nations and made it increasingly difficult to 
maintain ethnically or nationally exclusive us-them dichotomies (Castells 1997; 
Beyer 2007; Hedetoft 2009; Wuthnow, 1994). Increased social differentiation within 
states, mass international migration and the formation of de-territorialised social, 
economic and political networks, have also augmented “the attendant distrust 
between masses and elites” (Hedetoft 2009, p.263) and contributed to the 
displacement of the nation as the primary structure of identification by an array of 
other identity markers that include gender, ethnicity, race, religion, sexuality, modes 
of consumption etc (Beyer 2007; Demarath & Williams 1985; McGraw 2003; Santiago, 
2009). In addition, particularly in Western Europe, the position of the nation and of 
nationalism has continued to be compromised by its symbolic associations with the 
colonial past (Hedetoft 2009). 
 
Yet for Bellah, and for those that have followed Bellah, civil religion cannot simply 
disappear. In order to explain why this is, and to prepare the ground for the 
subsequent discussion, it is useful to briefly revisit what Cristi and Dawson (2007) 
called the dual intellectual heritage of civil religion. 
 
One of the features of the civil religion literature is the large number of, at times 
divergent, formulations of the concept (Angrosino 2002; Crook 2010). These reflect 
two quite different intellectual traditions found in Bellah’s initial exposition. 
However, both traditions emphasise the centrality of civil religion within modern 
democracies. First, theorisation of civil religion owes much to Durkheim. Within this 
tradition, civil religion has tended to be conceived of as “culture religion”; as “a 
common set of rituals, ideas and symbols” that can “supply an overarching sense of 
unity even in a society riddled with conflicts” (Angrosino 2002, p.246). This tradition 
emphasises the integrative function of civil religion. It also conceives of civil religion 
as a largely spontaneous phenomenon that responds to basic social, political and 
psychological needs, which would previously have been at least partially met by 
traditional religions, thus making civil religion an inevitable component of all modern 
societies (Bellah 1974; Cristi 2009). Within this tradition, then, it would be impossible 
for civil religion to disappear unless it was replaced by another form of religion. 
 
The second tradition, which can be traced back to Rousseau, provides a rather 
different theoretical perspective. This tradition places far greater emphasis on the 
purposive political dimension of rituals and symbols that are oriented towards civil 
and political order. Civil religion is conceived of as at least in part the product of the 
conscious actions of political elites (Cristi 2001), or of other factions within society 
4 
 
who may seek to “annex” civil religion to their particular cause (Parsons 2002, p.4; 
see also Angrosino 2002). This has two important implications. First, scholars who 
have engaged with this tradition have questioned the idea that civil religion serves a 
primarily integrative function on the grounds that it can be and has been used to 
exclude others and to “inflame sectarian tensions” (Angrosino 2002, p.252; see also 
Cristi & Dawson 1996; Long 1974; Santiago 2009). Second, by emphasising its 
political utility, this tradition also challenges notions about the spontaneity of civil 
religion. Yet whilst on this view civil religion may not be considered sociologically 
inevitable in the way that it is in the Durkheimian tradition, the sacralisation of 
national attachment is still identified as being politically indispensable in the context 
of modern societies characterised by a decline of traditional religion and increasing 
social differentiation (Crook 2010). 
 
Towards a global civil religion 
 
If civil religion is either inevitable or indispensable, the question then concerns how 
civil religion might be transformed in an era of globalization, and whether the nation 
will continue to provide the focus of these practices of sacralisation. 
 
What Bellah proposes is that the underlying sociological need for a common religion 
would eventually be met by the emergence of a global and unifying civil religion. He 
hypothesised that this could happen either through the convergence of existing 
national civil religions, or through the steady insertion of universalising elements 
into extant national civil religions (Cristi & Dawson 2007). What it would be based 
on, however, would not be the sacralisation of society (the nation) but the 
sacralisation of the person (Barker 2009; Bellah 1967; Cristi 2009). For both Bellah and 
Durkheim, the decline of national differences and increasing social differentiation 
will precipitate a situation in which the only thing that unites atomised modern 
individuals will be their common humanity (Cristi 2009). It would therefore be this 
shared humanity that became the object of the practices of sacralisation. Such a “cult 
of man” (Durkheim 1898/1973) would centre on the ritualisation of “the human 
person as the carrier of inalienable rights, dignity and freedom” (Cristi & Dawson 
2007, p.285), making the human person, in its abstract form, “the repository of the 
sacred and the symbol of modern morality” (Cristi 2009, p.59; see also Beckford 1989; 
Featherstone 1990; Wallace 1973). 
 
As Cristi and Dawson (2007) have noted, there would appear to be some empirical 
evidence to support such a proposal. Most notably, the last decades of the 20th 
century saw “the global spread of the doctrine of human rights” (Cristi & Dawson 
2007, p.285) through a combination of international political agreements and legal 
instruments, as well as through the actions of an array of “transnational issue 
networks” (Keck & Sikkink 1998) that have grounded much of their claim-making in 
notions of human rights – movements such as Amnesty, as well as various 
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movements for gender equality, racial equality, gay rights, and social, financial or 
environmental justice. Furthermore, we can also observe, as Warburg (2009) does in 
her account of an annual joint Danish and American festival on 4th July in Rebild, 
Denmark, how such universalising themes have filtered into and “coloured” local 
and national rituals of belonging. 
 
Reconfigurations of extant civil religions 
 
However, it has been argued that any such transition towards a global civil religion 
would seem to be problematized both by the difficulty of negotiating the universal 
themes around which a global civil religion could cohere (Barker 2009; Warburg 
2009) and by the fact that new forms of civil religion do not simply replace what has 
gone before them, but instead “will likely co-exist, and sometimes clash, with other 
religions” (Cristi & Dawson 2007, p.285). In spite of the pressures outlined above, 
national civil religions are unlikely simply to fade as long as national belonging 
continues to respond to a number of social, psychological and political needs. There 
is plenty of evidence that for the time being it still does, at least for some segments of 
society. Recent studies of national identification point, for example, to the salience of 
national identities as a source of ontological security in a world of increasingly fluid 
political, economic and cultural boundaries (Kinnvall 2006; Skey 2012), and even a 
cursory glance at contemporary European politics makes clear that there is still 
considerable political capital to be derived from the articulation and reaffirmation of 
the nation and of national identities. 
 
Therefore, alongside the emergence of any globalised or globalising forms of civil 
religion, we might also expect to find numerous ways in which extant civil religions 
are being adjusted and adapted in response to the kinds of political and cultural 
pressures associated with increased social differentiation and the erosion of state 
sovereignty. Furthermore, given the dual intellectual heritage of civil religion, we 
ought also expect that these reconfigurations of civil religion: 1) comprise both 
spontaneous grassroots responses and more conscious efforts by the political elite or 
by other factions within society; and 2) that they may reflect not only an impulse 
towards societal integration, but also at times an impulse towards exclusion and the 
construction of societal boundaries. 
 
Attenuated rituals of national belonging 
 
There have been a number of recent studies that have started to explore some of the 
forms that such adjustments and adaptations might take. One of these would appear 
to have been the attenuation of some aspects of civil religious rituals and symbols. 
As Parsons observes, in societies characterised by ever greater social heterogeneity, 
the “avoidance of over-specific civil religious symbols” that can be imbued with 
exclusivist agendas would seem to be necessary if civil religion is to provide a source 
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of cohesion rather than conflict (Parsons 2002, p.268). So, for example, looking at 
rituals of national belonging in Western Europe in historical perspective, Hedetoft 
(2009) describes how much of the “bombastic” pomp and ceremony that often 
characterised such rituals during the era of colonial expansion has been set aside. In 
its place, we tend to see national belonging ritualised in “civic, symbolic and cultural 
forms that are detached from politically exclusivist imagery” – fewer military 
parades and more public celebrations of community volunteers and charitable 
organisations (Hedetoft 2009, p.265). 
 
This kind of capacity to adapt to and accommodate the socio-political complexities 
of the nation and of national belonging has long been integral to the ability of 
national civil religions to function as a source of societal integration. Indeed, using 
the example of the commemoration of war dead after the Civil War in the USA and 
the First World War in Great Britain, Parsons argues that it is precisely the 
ambiguities and generalizations in the performance of national civil religion that 
enables such rituals to promote inclusion and mitigate sectarian tensions (2002, 
pp.11-68). Yet, it remains unclear the extent to which highly attenuated 
contemporary forms of national civil religion, stripped of some their affective power, 
can continue to fulfil the social, psychological and political functions with which 
they have formerly been associated (Hedetoft 2009; Parsons 2002). And of course, 
some factions within a society might have little interest in mitigating sectarian 
tensions. 
 
The “glocalisation” of civil religions 
 
It has also been observed that civil religious rituals and symbols may adapt by 
working across multiple scales – a form of adaptation that would appear particularly 
salient in light of the limitations of more attenuated rituals of national belonging. 
Although local forms of civil religion have to date received considerably less 
attention than national civil religions, at a time when national civil religions are 
confronted by growing pressures to put aside “over-specific civil religious symbols”, 
more localised rituals of belonging – folk festivals, celebrations of local patron saints 
and so forth – may respond to the integrative (and exclusionary) impulse by 
providing a “closer, more specific form of civil religion which genuinely unifies a 
particular local society” (Parsons 2002, p.266). 
 
Yet at the same time – and in keeping with theories around processes of 
“glocalization” (Beyer 2007) – these localised and inherently specific civil religious 
symbols and rituals can also be incorporated within increasingly supra-national 
political and cultural structures that may enable civil religion to "move beyond 
narrow nationalism to include internationalist values and themes" (Parsons 2004b, 
p.861) . For example, in Parsons' description of the cult of St. Catherine of Siena and 
her adoption as one of the twin patron saints of the European Union in 1999, he 
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traces how a set of socially specific and historically embedded local rituals that had 
previously been incorporated into a national civil religion have now also been 
inserted into the ritualisation of supra-national orders of identification (Parsons 
2002; 2004a; 2004b; 2008). Similar intersections of the local, national and supra-
national can be found in Warburg's (2009) description of the Rebild festival in 
Denmark and the way in which universal themes, such as human rights or 
democracy, appear to offer a basis on which the rituals and symbols of national 
belonging of different nations can form, at least temporarily, a type of "transnational 
civil religion". 
 
The case of the EDL: From ethnic nationalisms to clashing civilizations 
 
The language and protest performances of nationalist political parties and social 
movement organizations, such as the EDL, can provide especially intriguing case 
studies of how national civil religions are adapting to the pressures associated with 
globalization. This is due to the fact that their adherents are particularly engaged in 
the sometimes conscious, sometimes sub-conscious work of reconfiguring the rituals 
and symbols of the nation to resonate with wider political discourses and 
contemporary social mores. 
 
In the case of the EDL, and as might be expected of a broadly nationalist group, 
activists have worked upon conventional national civil religious symbols and rituals 
– national flags, St. George’s Day paradesiv, Remembrance Day gatherings, or events 
to commemorate the attacks on London of 7th July 2005. However, what has been 
noticeable about the EDL has been both that activists articulations of the nation have 
differed somewhat from those associated with many traditional nationalist or far 
right groups, and that the rituals and symbols deployed by EDL activists have also 
worked upon contemporary political meta-narratives that transcend notions of 
national belonging (Busher 2013; Jackson 2011). 
 
“How are we racists? We’re here to defend our English culture!”v 
 
Although notions of the nation and national belonging are prominent in the 
narrative of many EDL activists, when they are articulated they have tended, for the 
most part, to be defined not so much by ethnicity or race or even by indigeneity, but 
by reference to notions of an imagined English “culture” and English/British 
“values” (Busher 2013).  Much of the rhetoric deployed by movement leaders has 
been permeated with concepts of cultural threats, and concerns about the 
“preservation of traditional and national cultural values” have been prominent in 
activists’ explanations of their involvement in the group (Bartlett & Littler 2011). 
 
This discourse of “culture” and “values” is very much in keeping with trends 
observed elsewhere across Europe where, among the adherents of a number of 
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nationalist and far right groups, references to racially or ethnically defined nations 
appear increasingly to be eclipsed by, or at least to be set alongside, discourses about 
imminent cultural threats (Allen 2010; Mudde 2007; Rydgren 2005). For the EDL, this 
framing of the movement has been significant on a number of levels. Since the EDL 
first emerged, opposition groups were quick to draw comparisons with and identify 
organisational cross-overs between the EDL and far right groups such as the British 
National Party, the National Front and Combat 18. However, the EDL leadership 
and many of its activists have consistently sought to distance the EDL from the 
“traditional far right”, and in particular from the overt biological racism and anti-
Semitism that has often undermined the credibility of traditional nationalist and far 
right groups in the UK (Copsey 2010; Jackson 2011). Concepts of a culturally-defined 
nation have provided activists with a means of articulating exclusivist group 
boundaries that have not necessarily carried with them the kind of public stigma 
associated with traditional far right discourses of race (Allen 2011). 
 
What this articulation of ideas of cultural nations has also done, has been to situate 
the EDL within and enable its activists to tap into and contribute to powerful 
discursive currents within the political mainstream. The appeals to the idea of a 
national culture and national values made by groups like the EDL work upon 
similar concepts expressed either implicitly or explicitly in a raft of policy positions 
held by mainstream political parties. We have seen, for example, the return to the 
rhetoric of “British values” both within policy fields such as that of social cohesion 
(Kundnani 2007, pp.121-140) and in the recent forays by the leaders of the main 
political parties into discussions about “Britishness” or “Englishness”. 
 
However, and of particular interest in the context of this article, EDL activists’ 
narratives of a culture and of a value-system under threat have also worked upon 
and incorporated the language and symbols associated with the rise to global 
political prominence of ideas about a “clash of civilizations” (Huntingdon 1993; 
1997). 
 
The clash of civilizations: The rise of a political myth 
 
Huntingdon, like Bellah, also anticipated that nations would increasingly be 
supplanted by supra-national structures of political power and belonging. However, 
for Huntingdon this breaking down of national-cultural distinctions would not lead 
towards a common global civil religion. Instead, he envisioned that it would lead to 
a situation in which a series of fundamental cultural differences between major 
civilizations, in particular between Western, Islamic and Sino-Confucian 
civilizations, would replace ideology and economics as the primary sources of 
conflict (1993; 1997). 
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Since Huntingdon set out this argument, his ideas have been attacked on a number 
of theoretical and empirical grounds. For example, it has been argued that his thesis 
relies on a rather dubious ontology of civilizations (Adib-Moghaddam 2008; Sen 
1999); that civilization is a relatively poor predictor of preferences for different types 
of political leadership (Breznau et al. 2011); and that current patterns of conflict and 
international terrorism indicate that the factors that drive these conflicts are more 
likely to be associated with strategic decision making than with any kind of 
underlying civilizational tensions (Fox 2002; Neumayer & Plumper 2009). 
 
Yet these critiques have done little to quell the influence of Huntingdon’s thesis. 
This, Bottici and Challand (2006) argue, is because the “clash of civilizations” has 
moved beyond being an empirically testable hypothesis, to become a “political 
myth” - a “common narrative by which the members of a social group can provide 
significance to their political conditions and experience” (2006, p.315)  - a status it 
achieved due to the way it resonated with ascendant political agendas and with the 
dominant media narratives in the immediate aftermath of the attacks by Al-Qaeda 
on 9/11 2001 and the subsequent War on Terror (Bonney 2008; Rizvi 2011). 
 
As a result of the diffusion of Huntingdon's thesis, a “clash mentality” (Adib-
Moghaddam 2011, p.5) appears to have gained considerable purchase today. In the 
political sphere, it permeates debates in multiple policy fields in Europe and North 
America, ranging from foreign policy to public order, social cohesion, and counter-
terrorism, while in the public sphere, it continues to pervade many of the media and 
popular narratives surrounding terrorism and the apparent failures of 
multiculturalism (Adib-Moghaddam 2011; Angrosino 2002; Bonney 2008; Bottici & 
Challand 2006). 
 
‘We’re the infidels of the EDL…’ 
 
It is  precisely this “clash mentality” and its attendant references to civilizational 
boundaries that EDL activists have woven together with the rituals and symbols of 
national belonging that they articulate and perform during demonstrations, 
meetings, online discussions and other activities. Although activists refer to 
themselves and to their fellow activists as “patriots”, many have also adopted the 
popular appellative of “infidels”, a direct reference to being non-Muslims - one of 
the most popular songs among EDL activists is about “the infidels of the EDL” who 
are “coming down the road”. The EDL emblem, which incorporates the cross of St. 
George, the patron saint of England, also contains the EDL motto, “in hoc signo 
vinces” (Figure 1), a phrase associated both with the adoption of Christianity by 
Emperor Constantine I and with the order of the Knights Templar. Civilizational 
consciousness is also invoked in the repeated use of images of medieval crusades 
and crusaders – the symbol par excellence of a “clash of civilizations” between a 
Christian Europe and an Islamic Middle East – as a common motif in the formal and 
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informal promotional materials that circulate among activists and their supporters 
(see Figures 2 & 3). 
 
 
Figure 1. EDL emblem and motto. 
 
 
Figure 2. Picture circulated among activists by Facebook early 2012. 
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Figure 3. EDL Essex Division banner. Photograph taken by the author 5 ⁄ 5 ⁄ 2012. 
 
The EDL website and speeches by the EDL leadership provide particularly rich 
examples of the way that the group has sought to annex both symbols of the nation 
and various symbols of “Western culture”. Here, for example one often finds claims 
about how (militant) Islam threatens “Western values” such as gender equality, 
human rights, democracy or sexual freedoms – a civilizational discourse - combined 
with references to how these "Western values" that are enjoyed in England/Britain 
were achieved through the "sacrifices of our forefathers who gave their lives fighting 
against Nazi Germany”vi – an intensely national discourse. 
 
It appears to have been this ability of movement leaders and activists to effectively 
combine rituals and symbols of national and civilizational belonging that has been 
integral to the sustained support enjoyed by the movement. Certainly, activists’ 
sense of moral purposevii has been greatly enhanced by the way in which appeals 
both to national identity and civilizational belonging have been used by activists to 
transform an array of essentially local campaigns often grounded in activists’ 
concerns about the way that they see their own neighbourhoods changing – a protest 
against the building of a new mosque, a campaign against companies and 
institutions that only sell halal meat, or complaints about the opening of a Muslim 
school – into part of a broader and more existential struggle against the eradication 
of an imagined English way of life through the “Islamification of Europe”. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In a context of increasing social differentiation, mass immigration and decreasingly 
clear parameters of state sovereignty, the project of defining “who belongs to the 
nation and who does not” (Wuthnow 1994, p.131) is one that has become ever more 
complicated. It is perhaps therefore inevitable that, as Bellah anticipated, national 
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civil religions will fade, and that some form of global civil religion coloured with 
universalist values will emerge. 
 
However, while national attachments continue to serve a range of important social, 
psychological and political functions, it is likely that the shifting intersectionalities 
between national, local, and supra-national attachments will continue to manifest in 
diverse constellations of symbols that reflect these different layers of belonging. 
These will continue to emerge not only through spontaneous responses from within 
civil society, but also through conscious efforts of political elites and of other factions 
– such as the raft of new nationalist or far right groups in Europe – who may seek to 
direct civil religious symbols and rituals towards their own particular cause. As 
Cristi and Dawson caution, “we have no reason to believe that the political 
manipulation of civil religious discourses is limited to national contexts” (2007, 
p.285). So, however civil religious rituals and symbols may combine local, national, 
supra-national or even universalist themes, they will continue to reflect both the 
impulse towards societal integration – as manifest for example in the attenuation of 
rituals of national belonging – and the impulse towards exclusion and the 
construction of societal boundaries. 
 
The protest performances and narrative of groups like the EDL can provide a 
particularly interesting, as well as a politically and socially important, example of 
how these reconfigurations of national civil religions may unfold. At least among the 
adherents and supporters of the EDL, rituals and symbols of national belonging are 
being reinvigorated by infusing them with symbols that invoke a form of supra-
national belonging – a civilizational consciousness. Through this multi-scaling of their 
narrative, EDL activists have not only drawn on latent affective structures associated 
with national belonging but have also tapped into a pervasive political and social 
discourse about a “clash of civilizations” and the threat posed by (militant) Islam to 
Western national cultures. This has enabled EDL activists to invest their rhetoric and 
their protest activities with a greatly amplified set of meanings that, in spite of 
limited organisational resources, internal power struggles and consistently hostile 
coverage in the mainstream media (Busher 2013), would appear to have done much 
to generate and maintain support for the group. 
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i For example, while the national leadership of the EDL has repeatedly claimed that it opposes only 
what it calls “militant Islam”, a number of speeches given during EDL demonstrations indicate that 
there is a significant component of the EDL activist community who see themselves as opposing more 
generally the “Islamification” of the UK. From this point forward I use ‘(militant) Islam’ to represent 
this ambiguity.  
ii As well as referring to the growing body of published research on this group, this article also draws 
on research carried out by the author with EDL activists in Southeast England. This comprises 15 
months of overt ethnographic observation; approximately 40 hours of recorded biographic interviews 
with grassroots activists, and two audio diaries kept by local EDL organisers. While there are clear 
limitations to this study – most notably the limited geographic distribution of respondents – the 
extended contact with a relatively small number of activists has facilitated triangulation of data across 
the three methods of primary data generation. 
iii “The religious aspect might be derived from attempts to infuse the civil order with a transcendent 
purpose and legitimacy by using explicitly religious symbols, often rooted in the dominant religion of 
the nation. Conversely, the religious dimension might be based in mutually meaningful public rituals 
and symbols that come to be seen as sacred by members of the group” (Cristi 2009, pp.48-9). 
iv St. George is the patron saint of England. 
v Informal conversation with EDL activist, male, Dagenham, 12th March, 2011   
vi Author’s paraphrasing of a common refrain in conversations with EDL activists.  
vii For a discussion of the role of moral outrage and a sense of moral purpose on social movement 
activism see Jasper 1997, pp.183-228.  
